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ABSTRACT 
 
Technology development in firms is frequently based on a combination of internal and 
external technological learning. Consequently, firms need to develop both technological 
capital (a patent portfolio) and alliance capital (a portfolio of technology alliances). This 
paper examines the relationship between technological capital, alliance capital and their joint 
impact on the technological performance of firms, with an application to the ASIC industry. 
We find that positive marginal returns to alliance capital are decreasing at higher levels of 
alliance capital. Technological capital and alliance capital can either augment or reduce each 
others’ influence on innovation performance depending on the stage of the technology life 
cycle in the industry. A reinforcing relationship related to absorptive capacity requirements 
and technological uncertainty is present in early stages, while technology leakage and market 
competition effects render the combination of high levels of technological and alliance capital 
counterproductive in later stages of the technology life cycle.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Knowledge is regarded as the single most important resource of firms active in high tech 
industries (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1997). The 
development of technological knowledge bases increasingly relies not only on internal 
technological strengths but also on knowledge sourced from, or jointly developed with, other 
firms. In the past two decades strategic technology alliances have received substantial 
attention as a means to combine internal and external technological capabilities to improve 
technological performance (e.g. Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Shan et al., 1994; Powell 
et al., 1996; Mitchell and Singh 1996; Stuart, 2000; Laursen and Salter, 2006). Increasing 
R&D costs, growing sophistication of technologies, and the potential of emerging 
technologies to undermine the competitive positions of incumbents, have spurred the growth 
of ‘learning alliances’ through which companies can speed up their capability development 
and exploit knowledge developed by others (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995, 2004). Market 
transactions are generally considered to be a weak alternative to alliances as most valuable 
knowledge is cumulative and tacit in nature. This specific nature makes it hard to transfer 
knowledge between organizations through market transactions (Mowery, 1988; Mowery et 
al., 1995; Osborn and Baughn, 1990).  
 
A growing number of studies have investigated the impact of portfolios of technology 
alliances on firm performance (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Shan et al., 1994; Powell 
et al., 1996; Mitchell and Singh 1996; Stuart, 2000; Sampson, 2007; Jiang et al., 2010). Other 
studies have examined the role of internal technological capabilities and technology 
portfolios on firms’ innovation performance, with particular attention to the role of 
technological diversification (e.g. Leten et al., 2007; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Breschi 
et al., 2003; Patel and Pavitt, 1997; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Nerkar 
and Roberts, 2004). Yet, these two sources of technological capability building, internal 
technological development and external technological learning, have to be considered jointly 
in their impact on technological performance. The seminal contribution by Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) suggests that internal technological capabilities are a prerequisite for a 
sufficient absorptive capacity necessary to understand, absorb, and effectively utilize 
externally acquired know-how. Internal technology development is increasingly interwoven 
with the external sourcing of technologies and they are often seen as mutually reinforcing 
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each other’s effect on the rate of innovation of a company (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane 
and Lubatkin, 1998; Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2000; Van de Vrande et al., 2006). This 
suggests that internal technological capabilities strengthen the impact of alliance portfolios 
(Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). On the other hand, companies 
with strong internal technological capabilities may have least to gain from external 
technology sourcing, and most to loose from asymmetric learning benefits accruing to 
alliance partners (e.g. Khanna et al, 1998; Ahuja, 2000a). Surprisingly, there are no large-
sample empirical studies that analyze the potential joint effects of internal and external 
knowledge acquisition on the technological performance of firms.1 
 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the technological performance of firms 
in high-tech industries and their internal technological capital and technology alliance 
portfolios. Drawing on the extant literature on technological learning, the resource based 
theory of the firm, and theories of strategic alliance formation, we develop hypotheses on the 
nature of these relationships. We show that the joint and interactive performance effects of 
technological capital and alliance capital depend crucially on the technology life cycle.2 A 
reinforcing relationship related to absorptive capacity requirements and technological 
uncertainty is present in early stages while technology leakage and market competition effects 
render the combination of high levels of technological and alliance capital counterproductive 
in later stages of the technology life cycle.  
 
We test hypotheses on a longitudinal dataset covering technological activities, alliance 
strategies, and financial data on the population of producers of ASICs (application-specific 
integrated circuits) in the period 1987-2000. The ASIC industry and its development over time is 
an interesting case to study, given the importance of technology driven competition and the 
myriad of technology alliance relationships in the sector. Our dataset covers all ASIC-producers 
over the most important phases of the technology life cycle characterizing the sector: from an 
early stage of rapid technology development under uncertainty in the 1980s to a mature stage in 
the later 1990s exhibiting incremental improvement of established technologies and intensifying 
competition.   
                                                     
1  A partial exception is Ahuja (2000a) who focuses on the impact of technical, commercial and social capital 
of firms on the formation of new alliances. Commercial resources are those required to convert technical 
innovations to products and services. In our research we focus on technological performance and abstract 
from commercial capabilities.  
2  We are indebted to an anonymous referee for the suggestion to focus on changing relationships between the 
variables of interest over time. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Drawing on the resource based view of the firm, we first establish a baseline hypothesis on 
the relationship between technological capital – which we conceptualize as past technological 
performance - and subsequent technological performance. We then discuss the relationship 
between alliance capital and technological performance. Finally we develop the hypotheses 
on the changing interaction between alliance capital and technological capita in the context of 
developments over the technology life cycle.  
 
Technological capital 
Over the past two decades, the resource-based view of the firm has gradually become one of 
the most influential theoretical perspectives in the field of strategic management (Wernerfelt, 
1984; Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 1997; Ahuja and Katila, 2004). The resource based view 
holds that resource heterogeneity is an important source of performance differentials among 
firms. Knowledge assets are seen as a major source of such resource heterogeneity (Kogut 
and Zander, 1996; Spender, 1996). A core premise of the knowledge-based view of the firm 
is that knowledge assets accumulated over time constitute the source of a firm’s sustainable 
competitive advantage in the marketplace. Firm-specific knowledge assets are of strategic 
interest because they are rare, imperfectly tradable and hard to imitate as long as part of the 
technological know-how is tacit in nature. The cumulative development over time of 
technology-related knowledge assets leads to what we label “technological capital” and is a 
function of past successful technology development activities. The development of this firm 
specific technological knowledge is time and resource consuming and as a result usually 
difficult to imitate by (potential) competitors. Moreover, building up technological capital 
bares substantial risks given the large up-front R&D costs involved while the technological 
and commercial outcomes may be highly uncertain (Mitchell and Singh, 1992). Because of 
the cumulative character of technology development, the current technological position of a 
company is shaped by its past technological activities (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Coombs and 
Hull, 1998; Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2007). Previous investments and strategic choices and 
their subsequent technology development outcomes determine the current position of a firm 
and shape its future technology options. Companies that have built up specific technological 
capital successfully in the past ahead of their rivals are expected to maintain a technological 
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lead, as lagging firms are less likely to be able to catch up through internal technology 
development (Shan, 1990; Podolny and Stuart, 1995; Stuart et al., 1999; Cefis, 2003, Roper 
and Hewitt-Dunas, 2007). Firms with accumulated technological capital based on past 
technology development successes are likely to be able to maintain superior technological 
performance, which in turn leads to a further accumulation of technological capital.3 This 
suggests the following baseline hypothesis: 
 
(Baseline) Hypothesis 1: Technological performance of a firm is a positive function of its 
technological capital (cumulative past technological performance) 
 
Alliance capital 
The resource based view of the firm has also been instrumental for the analysis of strategic 
alliance formation, as there is growing consensus that the rise in the number of strategic 
technology alliances has been driven by resource interdependence and complementarities 
(Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991; Nooteboom et al., 2007). A central 
position in a network of technology alliances has been recognized as a distinctive and 
important form of capital of innovative companies (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gilsing, 2008; 
Gulati, 1995, 1999). In this study, we term the firms’ existing portfolio of technology 
alliances its ‘alliance capital’. Particularly in rapidly changing technological fields, internal 
R&D efforts need to be complemented by external means of technology acquisition (Tyler, 
2001). The creation of a strategic technology alliance network can facilitate the access to 
technological resources across industries or technological fields. Alliances are often used by 
companies as instruments to acquire technological knowledge and to develop new skills that 
reside within the partnering companies (Hamel, 1991; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; 
Srivastava and Gnyawali, 2011). Previous research has established that technology alliances 
often have a positive impact on the technological performance of companies (Baum and 
Oliver, 1991; Mitchell and Singh, 1996; Uzzi, 1996; Powell et al., 1996; Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad, 1994; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).4 Technology alliances can ease a number 
of transactional and contractual differences (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Jarillo, 1988), enable 
firms to scan their environment for new windows of opportunities and promising new 
                                                     
3  An exception is the case of severe instability in the prevailing technological paradigm due to the rise of 
competence destroying breakthrough technologies (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Christensen, 1997; 
Christensen and Raynor, 2003), which makes it difficult for firms to build on their previously developed 
knowledge base. 
4  A notable exception is the work of Stuart (2000) who found no significant relationship between the number 
of alliances and the rate of innovation of semiconductor firms. 
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technologies (Duysters and de Man, 2003), and lower the risks and costs of developing new 
technologies in-house (Faems et al, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, research on interorganizational networks in general and technological 
alliance networks in particular has also pointed out that involvement in a broad range of 
alliances may lead to saturation and overembeddedness in the network (Kogut et al., 1992; 
Uzzi, 1997). This is, in particular the case when firms are involved in strong-tie relationships 
(Granovetter, 1973). A strong inter-firm network can lead to inertia that holds firms back 
from severing ties with existing partners and/or from entering into other and potentially more 
successful alliances. This may be due to an implicit expectation of loyalty to alliance partners 
and pressure from their partners to replicate ties within the group (Gulati et al., 2000; Gilsing 
and Lemmens, 2004). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998, p. 245) argue that the collective alliance 
capital resulting from dense networks can limit a firm’s openness to information and to 
alternative ways of technology development, which can lead to a “collective blindness” that 
may have detrimental effects on technological competitiveness. Embeddedness in existing 
technology partnerships can create a dependence that increases the likelihood of a company 
falling in the so-called familiarity trap (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001)5. It is argued that 
experience and competence in a specific set of technologies leads to the emergence of a 
dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) and an increasingly rigid view on technological 
capabilities (Leonard Barton, 1992). This, in turn, reduces the probability of a company’s 
willingness to experiment with other problem solving approaches. This absence of 
experimentation reduces the chance that a company will discover new technological 
opportunities in high tech industries (Jaffe, 1986; Lunn and Martin, 1986; Levin et al., 1985, 
Sampson 2007).  
 
As the benefits of further expanding the alliance network may be limited, likewise the costs 
of allying can increase substantially in the number of alliances. Gomes-Casseres (1996) has 
shown that there is an upper-limit to the number of alliances that a company can manage 
successfully. Alliance management draws on the same, scarce, managerial resources and 
management attention and management also has to coordinate across alliances (Harrigan, 
1985; Hoang, 2001). Management attention and integration costs may grow exponentially 
                                                     
5  Learning traps (Levinthal and March, 1981, 1993) embody the conflict between routines that enable the 
organization to perform well in the short run but may position the organization unfavorably for the future 
(Ahuja and Lampert, 2001: 523). 
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beyond a certain number of alliances (Duysters and de Man, 2003; Duysters et al, 2012) and a 
firm’s effectiveness at managing its alliances will decline with the number of alliances it 
maintains (Deeds and Hill, 1996, Hoang, 2001). Larger technology alliance portfolios 
increase the risks of dealing with various, often unfamiliar streams of knowledge that are 
increasingly difficult to integrate (Grandstrand, 1992; Ahuja and Katila, 2004; Vanhaverbeke 
et al., 2009). Hence, a firm can start to suffer from information overload and diseconomies of 
scale. A second reason for increasing costs of alliances is that unwanted knowledge spillovers 
and free rider effects are likely to increase as the number of alliance partners grows. More 
partners implies more potential free-riders or ‘recipients’ of spillovers while, at the same 
time, resources and management time to monitor this need to be spread over a larger number 
of partnerships. This implies that fewer managerial and R&D resources can be freed to focus 
on absorption and integration of technology developed within the alliances.  
 
The above arguments suggest that an increase in alliance portfolio size at some point will lead 
to reduced marginal benefits and effectiveness of additional alliances, whereas the extra costs 
of adding new alliances will increase. As a result, we expect an inverted-U shaped 
relationship between a firm’s existing stock of alliances (its alliance capital) and its 
technological performance.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The alliance capital of a firm (i.e. the number of prior technology alliances) 
has an inverted-U shaped effect on its technological performance. 
 
Alliance capital, technological capital and the technology life cycle 
Technological learning is increasingly based on a combination of internal and external 
learning (Laursen and Salter, 2006; Chesbrough 2003; Chesbrough et al. 2006). Both types 
of learning have been described in the literature as complements, specifically because 
external technology sourcing requires a sufficient level of internal R&D capabilities, i.e. 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2000; Cassiman 
and Veugelers, 2006; Arora and Gambardella, 1990). Firms that are capable of proper 
valuation and assimilation of external knowledge are more likely to profit from a strategy to 
enter into technology alliances and develop a broader internal technology base to reap the 
benefits of external technological learning (Mitchell and Singh, 1996; Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998, Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006). They may also have a greater ability to identify and 
evaluate the technological capabilities of specific potential partners, selecting on 
complementary expertise and reducing the risk associated with difficulties in selecting 
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partners (Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis, 2005). These arguments suggest a positive interaction 
between technological capital and alliance capital, as they reinforce each others’ effect on 
technological performance.  
 
On the other hand, there are arguments suggesting that combining alliance capital and 
technological capital may be detrimental for technological performance. Firms with strong 
and unique internal technological capabilities are likely to have abundant alliance 
opportunities. These firms are attractive to other firms that expect to benefit from access to 
these capabilities through alliances (Baum et al., 2000). However, at the same time, firms 
with strong internal capabilities are less likely to reap benefits from alliances in terms of an 
expected improvement in their own technological performance (Ahuja, 2000a), since firms 
possessing leading edge technological competences have less to learn from alliance partners 
(Kale and Singh, 1999; Khanna et al., 1998). Firms that are well endowed with technological 
competences may therefore receive alliance proposals of which the marginal benefits are 
relatively small. While technologically leading firms should be more selective in evaluating 
those proposals to focus on rent generating alliances, managers have to deal with imperfect 
information and may establish alliances that provide asymmetric learning benefits to their 
alliance partners. This risks generating and/or strengthening technology competitors in the 
future and eroding the firm’s technology lead and first-to-patent performance (Hamel et al., 
1989, Jiang et al., 2010). Second, the larger a firm’s alliance network in combination with 
abundant accumulated technological capital, the more likely that internal and external 
knowledge development will overlap, and that, at a particular level of internal technological 
capabilities, the costs of setting up and managing additional alliances will be higher than the 
benefits (Harrigan, 1985, Duysters and Lokshin, 2011). These arguments suggest that 
stronger internal capabilities may decrease the benefits of expansion of alliance portfolios.  
 
The interaction between technology and alliance capital over the technology life cycle 
The role of the contrasting influences of combining technological and alliance capital on 
technological performance is likely to depend on the stage of the technology life cycle. 
Technology life cycles comprise of early stage search for the most effective technologies in 
the context of abundant technological opportunities in the domain (Klevorick et al, 1995; 
Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Andersen, 1999; Schmoch, 2007). This is associated with 
entry by established and new firms attracted by these technological opportunities and 
perceived commercialization potential (Breschi et al., 2000). Once technological paradigms 
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have been established and barring instability of the paradigm (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; 
Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Raynor, 2003), technological development efforts 
focuses on incremental improvements. Given the cumulative, path-dependent process of 
technology development, accumulated technological capital capabilities established over 
time by the most successful firms weigh heavily in concurrent performance (Dosi, 1982).  
 
In the early stages of the technology life cycle, many firms are lacking a sufficient internal 
knowledge base and have yet to establish proper routines to value and assimilate external 
knowledge. The firms that succeed in developing these resources are much more likely to 
learn effectively from technology alliances and reap the benefits of building up alliance 
capital (Mitchell and Singh, 1996; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998, Nooteboom et al., 2007). Given 
that technology developments are still uncertain and subject to sudden change, broad 
technology search is of eminent importance and firms with capabilities to recombine 
knowledge from external technology sourcing and internal technology development are 
particularly well placed to record strong technological performance. This implies that the -
absorptive capacity- argument suggesting a positive interaction effect between technological 
and alliance capital is likely to weigh heavily in the early stages of the technology life cycle. 
 
In contrast, in later stages of the technology life cycle, most firms have built up absorptive 
capacity through cumulated technology development efforts such that absorptive capacity is 
less a distinctive resource to reap the benefits of strategic technology alliances. At the same 
time, technology development efforts focus on incremental and cumulative improvements, 
benefitting firms that are already leading in terms of the technological competition. In 
particular those firms that have been successful in the past, building up appreciable levels of 
technological capital, are less likely to benefit from technology alliances. The firms may 
have abundant alliance opportunities as attractive collaboration partners, but they are most 
likely to suffer from unwanted and unintended technology leakage effects. In these later 
stages of the technology life cycle, competitive forces have intensified and firms with smaller 
technological resources will be trying to catch-up technologically by teaming up with 
competent partners. These firms may use a cooperation strategy in order to leapfrog existing 
firms by drawing on the incumbent firm’s technological knowledge. With little expected 
benefits, increased risk of losing technological advantages and the costs of effective alliance 
portfolio management and integration, relying on alliance capital strategies is likely to be 
counterproductive for firms with abundant technological capital. Hence, the arguments 
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suggesting a negative interaction effect between technological and alliance capital are 
expected to be have substantial force in the later phases of the technology life cycle.  
 
Collectively, the above arguments suggest that the interactive effect of technological and 
alliance capital on technological performance depends on the stage of the technology life 
cycle, with an initial positive interaction turning into a negative effect in the later stages of 
development. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Alliance capital and technological capital reinforce each others’ effect on 
technological performance in the early stages of the technology life cycle. 
This positive interaction gradually disappears and can turn into a negative 
relationship in later stages of the technology life cycle. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL SETTING 
 
Our hypotheses are tested on the population of ASIC-producers that were active in the period 
1987-2000. ASICs - i.e. application-specific integrated circuits - are a special type of ICs 
(integrated circuits) that accounted for about 12 % of worldwide IC sales in 1995. In contrast 
with the general purpose ICs such as DRAMs and microprocessors, ASICs are built to perform 
only one particular function – e.g. converting digital signals of a CD or MP3-file into music 
(Dibiaggio, 2007; Einspruch and Hilbert, 1991). In the early 1980's, the use of layout structures 
and the adoption of physical synthesis in semiconductors led to the birth of the ASIC industry. In 
the late 1980's, the adoption of logic synthesis fundamentally changed the way in which most 
ASIC-designers approached their task. By the early 1990’s a dominant approach to ASIC design 
was established and in technological terms ASIC development entered a more stable period in 
the 1990s. The period 1987-2000 captures part of the volatile years of the ASIC industry as well 
as the period of maturing technologies and intensifying competition.  
 
The ASIC market is a typical high-tech industry where technology is the driving force shaping 
competition among firms. R&D-to-sales ratios are exceptionally high with ratios greater than 10 
percent no exception. The ASIC market is divided into three submarkets. According to the 
"Integrated Circuit Engineering Corporation" (ICE) the ASIC market includes the following 
categories of ICs: gate arrays (GA), full custom ICs (FC), and programmable logic devices 
(PLDs). Formal definitions are given in Table 1. 
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 Insert Table 1  
 
A wide range of specific system functions can be fabricated alternatively by gate arrays, full 
custom devices or PLDs. These three ASIC-categories are different devices realising the 
same system functionalities. As a result, there is almost no affinity between the targeted 
system function and the type of ASIC to use. The only exception is linear arrays, which are 
used to design analog or mixed (analog/digital) system functions. Linear arrays are applied 
mainly in the telecommunication and consumer electronics markets, where most signals are 
analog in nature. ASIC vendors typically have to make a choice between the three ASIC 
types minimizing the volume-dependent total cost per chip. PLDs are the cheapest solution 
for low volume ASICs. Once the production volume exceeds the level of a few thousands 
units, gate arrays become the most interesting ASIC solution. Custom ICs are the most 
efficient solution for production volumes that exceed several hundred-thousands of ASICs 
(Stolwijk et al., 2012). 
 
The development and production of ASICs requires the interplay between different economic 
agents. The most important participants are the ASIC design houses, IC manufacturing facilities, 
electronic system manufacturers and CAD-tool vendors. This list can be enlarged by a number 
of auxiliary and/or intermediate players, such as companies offering services in the 
microelectronics field, firms that translate customers' needs into the specifications for the design 
of ASICs, and university labs. Electronic system manufacturers usually build a foothold in the 
ASIC market by vertical integration: they want to achieve a competitive advantage for their 
electronic systems through proprietary ASIC designs. Electronic system manufacturers also 
make corporate-wide deals and second-source agreements with foundries. Large system 
manufacturers have their own ASIC design house and foundry or they acquire one. Vertically 
integrated system manufacturers still cooperate with specialised design houses because of 
recurrent peaks in design work. Large, integrated electronic system manufacturers have their 
own fab-lines. Their ASICs are processed together with standard ICs. Smaller companies set 
up agreements with different foundries to process their ASICs. Second-source agreements are 
frequently used in order to ensure availability of ASICs on time and to avoid lock-in 
situations. Captive producers - e.g., IBM and DEC - also establish second-source agreements 
because of peaks in demand. For complex ASIC-designs companies establish numerous joint 
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development and cross-licensing agreements (Vanhaverbeke et al. 2002), with technology 
alliances focused on keeping up with the latest technologies (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1996).  
 
The role of alliances in the ASIC-industry changed however over time. In the 1980’s the 
industry was still in its infancy. The adoption of physical synthesis, which gave birth to the 
ASIC industry, and the adoption of the logic synthesis later in the 1980’s (FPGA) turned the 
eighties in a highly volatile period for ASIC producers. It was a period characterized by high 
technological uncertainty. Technology alliances focused on new approaches to increase 
functionality, and technologies were changing rapidly in the absence of a dominant approach. By 
the end of the 1990’s, the ASIC technology has been well established and was even considered 
to be mature (McClean, 2001). The market turbulence and the rapid technological development 
of the early days were replaced by established applications building on known technology 
solutions for particular customer requirements. Technological development focused more on 
process design as time to market considerations - guaranteeing that customers' products get to 
the market on time – became a crucial competitive consideration.  
 
DATA, VARIABLES AND MODELING 
 
Data sources 
 
Our panel dataset covers the population of ASIC producers over the period 1987-2000. This 
specific period was characterized by strong growth and high technological turbulence. This is 
probably the most salient phase in the history of the ASIC industry. Based on ASIC patent data 
from the USPTO, strategic alliance data from the MERIT-CATI database on technology 
alliances (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1993), and ASIC industry reports, we identified 117 firms 
active as ASIC producers during that period, which resulted in an unbalanced panel of 1190 
observations. 
 
The data on strategic alliances relate to alliances of which the major focus is on technological 
developments in the ASIC-industry. In the CATI database only those types of inter-firm 
agreements are being collected that contain arrangements for transferring technology or joint 
research and development. Mere production or marketing agreements are excluded on the 
basis of the description of the alliances in the public sources, which are used as a basis for the 
database. Descriptions were checked manually for each alliance. During the period 1982-2000, 
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643 ASIC-related strategic technology alliances were identified. Alliance activity grew to a first 
peak in the mid-eighties, followed by a decrease in the late eighties and the early nineties. More 
alliances were established again in the period 1994-2000.6  
 
 Insert Figure 1 
 
Strategic alliances in the ASIC industry consist of non-equity agreements of which the majority 
is joint development agreements. Joint ventures are the most important form of equity alliances. 
Our measures of technological performance and technological capital draw on patent data 
from the US Patent Office.7 In particular in industries where companies operate on a global 
scale, such as the ASIC-industry, U.S. patents are a good proxy for companies’ worldwide 
technological performance and technological capital. Financial data of ASIC producers have 
been gathered from different sources among which the annual ICE reports (McClean, 1985-
2001). The data contain the ASIC-sales, the distribution of the ASIC-sales across the three 
segments, and the R&D-intensity on the corporate level for these companies.  
 
Variable definitions and operationalization 
To test the hypotheses we constructed a number of variables. Table 2 shows the variable 
definitions.  
 
Insert Table 2 
 
The dependent variable, technological performance, is often operationalized by the rate at 
which patents are granted to innovating firms. However, patents are not equal in value. Some 
patents refer to basic knowledge at the core of a technology, while others are merely of 
incremental value. The technological importance of innovations can be estimated with the 
help of patent citations (Albert et al., 1991; Narin et al., 1987), with the value of patents 
increasing in the number of citations received. Hence, our dependent variable is the number 
                                                     
6  It would have been of interest to analyze the earlier years in the 1980s. However, because of a lack of 
industry information in the early 1980s and our use of alliance and technological stocks (build up over a 5 
year period), the first year we observe the (lagged) independent variable for identified sample firms is 1987. 
7  The patents were selected by means of a query on ‘ASIC’ and related concepts/definitions such as ‘gate 
array’, ‘linear array’, ‘FPGA’, ‘PLD’, ‘full custom’, ‘SPGA’ and ‘EPAC’. Patents can be categorized by 
means of the International Patent Classification, an internationally recognized hierarchical classification 
system comprising 118 broad sections and 624 subclasses nested within the classes. It is furthermore 
possible to subdivide the subclasses into 67.000 groups. ASIC-related patents are classified in a relatively 
small set of subclasses (75 in total). 
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of patents that are yearly granted to a company weighted by the number of citations. In order 
to correct for right censoring we estimated the number of citations patents would receive over 
their life-span, based on the number of citations they received using Hall et al.’s (2001) 
simulated cumulative lag distribution tables. The NBER citations database was used to 
determine patterns of citations (Hall et al., 2001). We adopted a nonlinear weighting scheme, 
assuming that the marginal informational content increases with the number of citations, as 
suggested in Trajtenberg (1990). We counted a patent grant as technological performance in 
the year the company applied for the patent. The dependent variable thus measures the 
number of patents that a company successfully applied for in a particular year weighted by 
their received citations8. 
 
Explanatory variables 
Technological capital (cumulative past technological performance) is calculated as the 
number of ASIC-related patents that an ASIC-producer successfully applied for in the five 
years prior to measured technological performance. Patents granted to a company are a good 
measure of the technological competences of a company (Narin et al., 1987) in industries 
where the propensity to patent inventions is relatively high (Arundel and Kabla, 1998) and 
extant research has used patent stock variables to represent cumulative knowledge bases (e.g. 
Leten et al., 2007; Vande Vrande et al. 2011). As with the dependent variable, we weigh 
patents with the number of citations they receive, using a nonlinear weighting scheme. 
Studies of R&D depreciation (Griliches, 1979, 1984) suggests that knowledge capital 
depreciates sharply, losing most of its economic value within 4-5 years. A moving window of 
5 years is therefore the appropriate time frame for assessing the impact of technological 
capital in high-tech industries (Podolny and Stuart, 1995; Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Ahuja, 
2000a). The inclusion of the stock of technological capital reflects the notion that the flow of 
new technology creation builds on the existing knowledge and technology stock, while the 
new technologies subsequently add to this cumulative knowledge and technology stock. We 
scale the variable by dividing it by 1000.9  
 
                                                     
8  Our weighting scheme uses patents that have been granted by the U.S. Patent Office before the end of 2000. 
Since the observation period is 1988-2000, there is no strong bias at the end of the period, as most patents 
are granted within a period of 2 to 3 years. Of all ASIC patents in our sample only 3.6% were granted after 4 
years. 
9  Scaling does not affect the empirical results but facilitates the presentation of estimated coefficients, which 
otherwise would become very small. As technological capital has partial properties of a lagged dependent 
variable, its coefficient will also reflect a range of unobserved firm-specific characteristics that allowed for 
effective technology accumulation. 
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Following Gulati (1995), we computed alliance capital by counting all technology alliance 
activities of the ASIC-producers prior to the year in which we measure technological 
performance. We opted for a moving window approach, assuming that only ‘ongoing’ alliances 
have an impact on the technological performance of the focal firm. Alliances, for which we 
observe termination within the observation period 1987-2000, are assumed to have an impact on 
the rate of innovation as long as they were not terminated. For the other alliances we assume that 
the lifespan of alliances is five years. This five-year window follows conventional assumptions 
in alliance network research (Kogut 1988, 1989; Gulati, 1995, 1999; Stuart, 2000; Lavie, 2007). 
We include the linear term and the squared term of alliance capital. Hypothesis 2 predicts a 
positive coefficient for the former and a negative one for the latter.10 
 
Finally, in order to test Hypotheses 3, we 1) create the interactive term of technological capital 
and alliance capital, 2) allow the coefficient of the interactive term to vary with the stage of the 
technology life cycle by multiplying it with a trend term (taking the value 0 in 1987). Hypothesis 
3 suggests a positive interaction term evaluated in the earliest year of development of the ASIC 
industry in our sample (hence a positive main effect), and a negative effect of the interactive 
term if multiplied with the trend term reflecting the change of sign of the interaction in later 
years of the technology life cycle.  
 
Control variables 
Following the arguments of Stuart (2000) and Baum et al., (2000) that the technological (and 
economic) performance of companies is not so much determined by the size of the alliance 
network but rather by the characteristics of the focal company’s alliance partners, we control 
for the technological strength of the firm’s alliance partners. Stuart (2000) finds evidence that 
alliances with partners that are technologically well endowed have a larger positive impact on 
post-alliance performance of the focal firm. We measure the alliance partners’ technological 
strength as the citation-weighted number of successful patent applications of the partners in 
the 5 years preceding the alliance. We scale the variable by dividing it by 1000. 
 
We include two time-variant firm-specific control variables: the natural logarithm of firms’ 
ASIC sales and R&D intensity. Large and R&D intensive companies possess more R&D 
                                                     
10 Alternatively, applying a weighting scheme for alliance based on the expected importance of alliance strength 
(e.g. with joint research receiving a higher weigh than cross licensing arrangement) produced very similar 
empirical results.  
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resources and may be more likely to benefit from economies of scale and scope in the process of 
R&D, improving technological performance (e.g. Leten et al., 2007; Pakes and Griliches, 1984; 
Hall, et al.,2001; Griliches, 1984, 1990). We also include a range of dummy variables to 
control for origin and type of firms. Firms can be involved exclusively in the production of gate 
arrays, standard cells or PLDs, or they can be involved in more segments at the same time. 
Segments are important in the sense that firms in each segment face different types of 
technologies, different competitors and different competitive or technological dynamics. We 
include a set of 6 dummy variables depicting the different segment combinations, with PLD 
manufacturers as reference group. We also include dummy variables controlling for the home 
region in which the firms are based. Firms from different home regions may for instance differ 
in their propensity to patent (in the US). We include dummies for headquarters based Asia or 
Europe, with North-America as reference group. A last dummy variable is included to control 
for possible biases due to the fact that some large companies produce ASICs only for their 
internal needs (captive market), i.e. for internal supply to their electronic systems operations. 
These captive producers are a small minority of ASIC-producing companies but are nonetheless 
important in terms of technological capabilities (e.g. IBM).  
 
Finally, we include annual dummy variables to capture changes over time in the propensity of 
firms to patent their inventions, as the number of ASIC-technology related patents increased 
from 50 in 1987 to 451 in 2000.  Part of this growth is the result of the growing importance of 
ASIC-products and the accelerating changes in this technological field. Moreover, firms have 
become increasingly aware of the earnings they can reap by improving intellectual property 
management and patenting strategies (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Teece, 1998; Rivette and 
Kline, 2000).  
 
Model specification and econometric issues  
The dependent variable is a count variable - i.e. the weighted number of patents a firm 
successfully filed for in a particular year. A Poisson regression approach provides a natural 
baseline model for such data (Hausman et al., 1984; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). A 
Poisson regression however assumes that the mean and variance of the event count 
distribution are equal and in particular for panel data this assumption is likely to be violated 
with overdispersion as the norm. In the case of our dependent variable, technological 
performance, the variance vastly exceeds the mean and a statistical test confirms 
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overdispersion.11 Instead, we used a random effects negative binomial regression model 
which allows for the variance to exceed the mean. The random effects specification controls 
for unobserved heterogeneity among firms, such that the coefficients of the alliance variables 
are likely to reflect the impact of differences in alliance strategies and not the effect of 
correlated but omitted unobserved firm characteristics.12 
 
RESULTS 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables. The 
correlations between the independent variables are not excessively high, apart from the 
definitional correlations between alliance capital and its squared term on the one hand and 
alliance capital and technological capital with the interaction term (and the trend-moderated 
interaction term) on the other hand.  
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the random effects negative binomial model explaining yearly 
technological performance (citation weighted ASIC patents) of the ASIC producers. Model 1 
in Table 4 is a baseline model omitting the hypothesis testing variables. Model 2 adds 
technological capital, and model 3 introduces alliance capital related variables. Model 4 
included the interaction term between technical and alliance capital, while in model 5 the 
trend term-moderated interaction effect is included. In model 1, firm size and R&D intensity 
are significantly positive. The technological performance of alliance partners also has a 
positive and significant effect on technological performance, in accordance with previous 
research (Stuart, 2000; Baum et al, 2000). European producers show a lower level of 
technological performance than US firms, ceteris paribus, and there are also significant 
differences between the types of ASIC producers. Adding technological capital in Model 2 
improves the overall fit and significance of the model. Technological capital has a highly 
significant impact on technological performance in line with our baseline Hypothesis 1. 
Adding the alliance capital variables in Model 3 increases the significance of the model 
further and generates an expected reduction in the coefficient of the technological capital of 
                                                     
11 The likelihood ratio test for overdispersion in the panel Poisson model confirmed overdispersion at the 
0.0001 significance level.  
12  Hausman tests suggested insignificant differences between the estimated coefficients in random effects and 
fixed effects models, with the latter producing very similar results. Hence we present result with the more 
efficient random effects estimator. 
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alliance partners. The linear effect of alliance capital is positive and the quadratic term is 
negative, supporting Hypothesis 2 and suggesting an inverted-U shaped relationship between 
alliance capital and technological performance.  
 
Insert Table 4 
 
In model 4, the interaction effect between alliance capital and technological capital is 
significantly negative, suggesting that on average over the period of analysis (1987-2000) 
investing in alliance capital is counterproductive for firms with high levels of existing 
technological capital (and vice versa). Once this interaction term is allowed to differ by the 
stage of the technology life cycle by introducing the moderation effect of the trend term, the 
interaction term turns significantly positive, while the trend moderator term is significantly 
negative. This confirms Hypothesis 3, and indicates a positive interaction effect in the earliest 
year of our analysis (1987), which gradually declines and turns negative in the later years. 
Inspection of the coefficients shows that the turning point (from positive to negative) is 
around 1994.  
 
In order to examine the effects of combining technological and alliance capital more 
precisely, we have to take into account all relevant coefficients. The joint impact of both 
types of capital on technological performance is visualized in figures 2a and 2b. The figures 
show predicted effects based on the estimates in model 5 for the years 1987 and 2000, which 
represent an early and a late year in the technology life cycle. The graphs are drawn for the 
95% intervals of technological and alliance capital in those respective years, which reflects 
the evolution of technological and alliance capital over the technology life cycle.13. Figure 2a 
plots the mean predicted technological performance as a function of technological capital and 
alliance capital in 1987. The figure shows that in this year ASIC firms could improve their 
technological performance by combining technological capital and external technology 
sourcing through technology alliances. Relying solely on alliance capital does not improve 
the innovation performance considerably – as is illustrated in Figure 2a when alliance capital 
increases while technological capital is kept at low values. Combining strong technological 
capital with an increasing number of alliances leads to much higher performance levels, 
                                                     
13 The predicted values of technological performance include the effects of the other control variables (at the 
sample mean in the specific year) and the average random effects. The technological performance dimension is 
displayed on a similar scale in the two figures to enable comparison. 
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illustrating that alliances and technological capital reinforce each others’ effect on 
technological performance in the early stages of the technology life cycle, as predicted in 
hypothesis 3. Figure 2b shows predictions for the year 2000. This figure displays a typical 
saddle point form, where either technological capital or alliance capital pays off, but with 
combinations of large stocks of technological capital with an extensive network of alliances 
detrimental for technological performance. While firms with small stocks of technological 
capital benefit from establishing alliances, established firms with larger technological capital 
only benefit from extending internal technological capita. The graph illustrates how in later 
stages of the technology life cycle the absorptive capacity advantages are arpparently 
outweighed by the risks and costs of combining large bases of technological and alliance 
capital, as argued in hypothesis 3.  
 
Insert figures 2a and 2b 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
The increasing requirements for successful innovation in high tech industries have forced 
companies to establish multiple technology alliances. Internal technology development is 
increasingly interwoven with the external sourcing of technologies and they are often seen as 
mutually reinforcing each other’s effect on the rate of innovation of a company (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2000; Van de Vrande et 
al., 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Chesbrough 2003).  
In this study we argued that there are good reasons to suggest that technological capital and 
alliance capital may be either be complements or substitutes, depending on the stage of the 
technology life cycle of the industry. On the one hand, firms with strong internal 
technological capabilities will be better able to assimilate and integrate external technology 
as suggested by the literature on absorptive capacity. Firms with well-developed 
technological capital may also have the ability to better identify and evaluate the 
technological competences of external partners, reducing the hazards associated with 
selecting technology partners. On the other hand, firms with strong technological capabilities 
may reap fewer benefits from alliances. They have less to learn from their alliance partners 
and risk creating competitors when they establish alliances that provide asymmetric learning 
benefits to their alliance partners. In addition, firms combining strong internal capabilities 
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and an extensive alliance portfolio are more likely to face overlaps in technology 
development efforts, while they have to invest substantial managerial and R&D resources in 
alliance efforts that are perhaps more efficiently invested in-house. We argue that the net 
impact of these forces is dependent on the state of development stage of the technology in the 
industry. In the early phases, absorptive capacity is crucial and alliances are needed to 
perform broad technology search under technological uncertainty and the absence of an 
established technological paradigm, suggesting a positive interaction. In the later phases of 
the technology life cycle of the industry, technologies and resource bases are established 
while technological development is more incremental and predictable. Absorptive capacity is 
much less of a crucial differentiator for success, while the leading firms with the largest 
technological capital bases face increasing competitive threats from technological followers 
in the industry. Under such circumstances the negative effects of combining technological 
and alliance capital outweigh the positive effects. 
Our analysis of technological performance in a longitudinal study of ASIC producers 
confirmed that technological capital and alliances are complements and mutually beneficial 
in the early years of the technology life cycle. There are decreasing marginal benefits of large 
alliance portfolios, but firms with strong internal technological capital bases are better able to 
avoid such declining benefits and are better able to efficiently operate larger alliance 
portfolios. Technological capital and alliance capital do not only have a positive independent 
effect on innovation performance, they also reinforce each other’s effect on technological 
performance. In contrast, in the later years of the ASIC technology life cycle, the interactive 
effect of technological and alliance capital gradually turns negative, as the absorptive 
capacity advantages are outweighed by the risks and costs of combining large bases of 
technological and alliance capital. 
The evidence on the intricate interactions between internal technological capital and alliance 
capital emphasizes the dominant role of absorptive capacity in early industry development, 
but suggests that the absorptive capacity argument is much less crucial for performance in 
mature phases of the technology life cycle. In principle, firms with strong technological 
capital bases may be better placed to circumvent potential risks of knowledge dissipation and 
improper partner selection associated with larger alliance portfolios, by evaluating the 
knowledge of potential allies, by identifying opportunities and complementarities, and by 
reducing the risks of entering into inapprbopriate inter-organizational collaborations (Prabhu, 
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Chandy and Ellis, 2005). However, our findings suggest that selection capabilities are a more 
salient force in early stages of the technology life cycle under uncertain and rapid technology 
developments. To shed further light on this issue, future work should take into account 
organizational factors in order to improve our understanding of the interaction between 
technological capital and alliance portfolios (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Zahra and George, 
2002; Todorova and Durisin, 2007). Firms might be able to overcome the negative effects of 
combined alliance and technological capital if they have invested resources in alliance 
capabilities in their organization. Alliance capabilities are defined 'as the organizational 
ability to manage a comprehensive alliance portfolio successfully' (Hoffmann, 2005, p.123). 
Overall, being equipped with a variety of alliance management skills is critical in enabling 
firms to manage their alliance networks efficiently.  
 
The current study has a number of managerial implications. As external technology sourcing 
becomes more and more important, innovating firms have increasingly been involved in 
establishing alliances and alliance portfolios. Managers can decrease R&D costs and risks, 
shorten time to market, and get access to emerging technologies through alliances or other 
technology sourcing modes. Sourcing or co-development of technological innovations 
through alliances has usually been considered as a management practice with positive effects 
on the innovation performance and bottom-line of companies. Our research shows that 
alliance portfolios generate the strongest effect on technology performance of companies with 
world-class technological skills and extensive patent portfolios in the early stages of the 
ASIC industry. Combining internal and external technology is particularly important to deal 
with the technological turbulence surrounding firms operating in the early stages of high-tech 
sectors. Alliances strategies, as they have been analyzed and prescribed in the past (Bamford 
et al., 2003; Doz and Hamel, 1998) may generate the largest benefits for companies with the 
strongest patent portfolios in emerging high tech industries. Our findings also imply that the 
management of individual alliances should be coordinated in a portfolio approach and should 
be integrated with technology management (Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Bamford et al., 2003). 
Alliance portfolio management and technology management have to be aligned, since the 
resulting technology performance of a company is determined by the joint effect of alliance 
networks and internal technology capabilities, as well as by the stage of technology life cycle 
(Heimeriks et al., 2007; Kale and Singh, 1999; Kale et al. 2000).  
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Our results suggest that differences in technological performance between ASIC firms result 
to an important extent from the way they are combining investments in both internal 
technology development and the sourcing of externally developed technology in specific 
phases of industry development. While extant research has paid substantial attention to 
technology life cycles (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Andersen, 1999; Schmoch, 2007; 
Breschi et al., 2000), this literature has mostly focused on identifying and measuring 
technology cycles, or varying patterns of entry, exit and growth across industry cycles. Our 
research suggests that the role and influence of open innovation and external knowledge 
sourcing strategies may differ importantly across the phases of industry and technology 
development. Future research should further explore these relationships, while clarifying to 
what extent the results can be confirmed in other high technology industry settings than the 
ASIC industry. 
 
Other limitations of our study suggest interesting possibilities for future research. One 
possibility is to examine in detail the characteristics of alliance networks and how these 
change over the technology life cycle. Network characteristics such as redundancy or the 
existence of structural holes (Burt, 1992; Coleman 1988, 1990; Baum et al., 2000; Ahuja, 
2000b) may interact with the technological capabilities of alliance partners to impact the 
effectiveness of alliance capital. In addition, (Nooteboom et al., 2007) has shown that the 
innovation performance of firms is not only determined by the technological capital of the 
focal firm and that of its partners but also by the technological distance between them as this 
shapes the learning opportunities within alliances. An analysis on the dyadic level could also 
explore whether the formation of new alliances is affected differently by the existing 
technological capital of the partnering companies depending on the stage of the technology 
life cycle. 
 
While we weighted patents by the citations they receive, patents may be valued differently by 
innovating firms as they are interested in deepening their core technologies as well as in 
exploring new and promising technologies. In line with the seminal paper of March (1991) 
several scholars have analyzed technology alliances in terms of exploration and exploitation 
(Faems et al., 2005; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Schildt et al., 
2005; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2012; Raisch et al, 2009; Lavie et al, 2011). The combined role of 
the technological and alliance capital on deepening existing technologies and exploring new 
technological areas is a further area for exploration. Is a firm’s existing technological capital 
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an asset or a liability in exploring new technologies? Do companies require different 
technology alliance networks over time to deepen the existing technologies and to explore 
new technologies? The answer to these questions may again be related to the concept of 
technology life cycles characterizing high tech industries. This suggests a challenging agenda 
for future research. 
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Table 1: ASIC definitions 
 
 
I. Semicustom IC: A monolithic circuit that has one or more customized mask layers, but does not have all mask 
layers customized, and is sold to only one customer. 
Gate arrays: A monolithic IC usually composed of columns and rows of transistors. One or more layers 
of metal interconnect and are used to customize the chip. 
Linear array: An array of transistors and resistors that performs the functions of several linear ICs and 
discrete devices. 
 
II. Custom IC: A monolithic circuit that is customized on all mask layers and is sold to only one customer. 
Standard cell IC: A monolithic circuit that is customized on all mask layers using a cell library that 
embodies pre-characterized circuit structures. 
Full custom IC: A monolithic circuit that is at least partially “handcrafted”. Handcrafting refers to 
custom layout and connection work that is accomplished without the aid of standard cells. 
 
III. Programmable Logic Device (PLD): A monolithic circuit with fuse, antifuse, or memory cell-based logic that may 
be programmed (customized), and in some cases, reprogrammed by the user. Field Programmable Gate Array 
(FPGA): A PLD that offers fully flexible interconnects, fully flexible logic arrays, and requires functional 
placement and routing. 
 Electrically Programmable Analog Circuit (EPAC): A PLD that allows the user to program and reprogram 
basic analog devices. 
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Table 2: Definitions of dependent and independent variables 
 
Variable name    Variable description Hypothesized effects 
 
Technological performance Count of the citation weighted number of ASIC-related patents successfully applied for in 
  the current year (t). Dependent variable. Dep. Var. 
 
Technological capital Count of the citation weighted number of ASIC-related patents successfully applied for by 
  the firm in the previous five years (t-5 to t-1); divided by 1000,  H1: Positive 
 
Alliance capital Number of technology alliances established by the firm 
   in the five previous years (t-5 to t-1) unless alliances were terminated earlier H2: Positive 
 
Alliance capital2 Squared term of alliance capital   H2: Negative  
 
Alliance capital * technological capital Interaction between alliance capital and technological capital   H3: Positive 
 
Alliance capital * technological capital* Interaction between alliance capital, technological capital and trend term H3: Negative 
   trend term (taking values 0 in 1987 up to 13 in 2000) 
 
Technological performance of alliance partners Sum of the patent citations received by the firm’s alliance partners,  
  as defined under alliance capital, divided by 1000 
 
R&D intensity Natural logarithm of the ratio of R&D expenditures over total sales, t-1,   
 
Firm size Natural logarithm of the ASIC sales of the firm, t-1   
 
Captive producer Dummy variable denoting that the firm is not selling ASICs on the market   
Asian Firm Dummy variable denoting that the firm is headquartered in Asia 
European Firm Dummy variable denoting that the firm is headquartered in Europe 
GA-producer Dummy variable denoting that the firm is producing only gate arrays 
SC-producer Dummy variable denoting that the firm is producing only standard cells 
PLD-producer Dummy variable denoting that the firm is producing only PLDs 
GA and SC producer Dummy variable denoting that the firm is producing gate arrays and 
  standard cells 
GA and PLD producer Dummy variable denoting that the firm is producing gate arrays and PLDs 
 
  33 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (N=1190) 
 
 
 
 
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 Technological perfomance 54.28 154.64
2 Technological capital 89.87 303.97 0.96
3 Alliance capital 14.03 15.86 0.16 0.14
4 Alliance capital2 448.22 865.87 0.07 0.07 0.93
5 Alliance capital * technological capital 1.93 5.78 0.89 0.90 0.34 0.28
6 Technological performance all. partners 4.07 3.21 0.24 0.22 0.66 0.47 0.30
7 R&D intensity (ln) 4.66 2.42 -0.02 -0.00 0.39 0.33 0.06 0.41
8 Firm size (ln) 3.92 1.52 0.26 0.28 0.49 0.38 0.35 0.48 0.59
9 Captive producer 0.05 0.23 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 0.21 -0.20
10 Firm is Asian 0.25 0.43 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.13 -0.12 0.10 0.43 0.32 -0.05
11 Firm is European 0.15 0.36 -0.10 -0.10 0.24 0.27 -0.07 0.07 0.16 -0.04 0.06 -0.25
12 GA-producer 0.19 0.40 -0.14 -0.14 -0.36 -0.24 -0.16 -0.32 -0.33 -0.40 0.09 -0.20 -0.12
13 SC-producer 0.19 0.39 -0.12 -0.11 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.23 -0.19 -0.25 0.02 -0.20 0.18 -0.24
14 PLD-producer 0.12 0.32 0.49 0.47 -0.03 -0.09 0.40 0.16 -0.29 -0.01 -0.09 -0.21 -0.16 -0.18 -0.18
15 GA and SC producer 0.36 0.48 -0.13 -0.12 0.09 0.03 -0.13 0.18 0.43 0.37 0.04 0.48 -0.01 -0.37 -0.31 -0.36
16 GA and PLD producer 0.01 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.08 0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10
17 SC and PLD producer 0.01 0.10 0.00 -0.00 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01
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Table 4: Random effects negative binomial analysis of the technological performance 
(citation weighted patents) of ASIC producers: 1988-2000.  
 
 
 
Notes:  *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10 (two sided tests).  Standard deviations in parentheses.  
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Technological capital 0.282*** 0.270*** 0.506*** 0.795***
[0.057] [0.057] [0.115] [0.126]
Alliance capital 0.298*** 0.307*** 0.256***
[0.047] [0.049] [0.052]
Alliance capital squared -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.008**
[3.160] [3.401] [0.004]
Alliance capital * technological capital -0.061** 0.167***
[0.027] [0.044]
All. capital * techn. Capital * trend (1988-2000) -0.027***
[0.005]
Technological performance of alliance partners 0.139*** 0.160*** 0.075** 0.077** 0.080**
[0.031] [0.031] [0.035] [0.036] [0.036]
R&D intensity 0.326*** 0.321*** 0.280*** 0.282*** 0.304***
[0.042] [0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.042]
Firm size 0.286*** 0.237*** 0.162*** 0.164*** 0.158***
[0.042] [0.043] [0.041] [0.042] [0.041]
PLD-producer 1.786*** 1.505*** 1.871*** 1.955*** 1.956***
[0.232] [0.242] [0.240] [0.245] [0.243]
GA-producer -0.767*** -0.804*** -0.225 -0.134 -0.1
[0.274] [0.272] [0.278] [0.282] [0.279]
SC-producer -0.521** -0.591*** -0.197 -0.081 -0.032
[0.230] [0.228] [0.229] [0.238] [0.236]
GA and SC producer -0.234 -0.241 -0.016 0.017 0.057
[0.164] [0.163] [0.161] [0.163] [0.161]
GA and PLD producer 2.141*** 1.960*** 2.248*** 2.283*** 1.917***
[0.268] [0.268] [0.264] [0.266] [0.273]
SC and PLD producer 0.401 0.26 0.173 0.205 0.001
[0.471] [0.468] [0.450] [0.448] [0.442]
Captive producer 0.263 0.113 0.124 0.114 0.043
[0.241] [0.238] [0.227] [0.227] [0.227]
Firm is European -0.981*** -0.941*** -1.209*** -1.283*** -1.197***
[0.203] [0.199] [0.200] [0.203] [0.196]
Firm is Asian -0.163 -0.131 0.23 0.249 0.186
[0.165] [0.164] [0.168] [0.169] [0.168]
constant and year dummies included included included included included
Observations 1190 1190 1190 1190 1190
number of firms 117 117 117 117 117
Wald Chi square test 509.30*** 604.24*** 705.31*** 700.62***  815.64***
Loglikelihood -2810 -2800 -2773 -2770 -2756
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Figure 1:  Cooperative R&D activities in the ASIC-Industry (1980-2000) 
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Figures 2a and 2b: The Impact of alliance capital and technological capital on 
technological performance: 1987 (2a) and 2000 (2b) 
 
Figure 2a 
 
 
Figure 2b 
 
Note: the displayed range of technological performance is set equal to Figure 2a. For the highest levels of 
Technological capital in the absence of alliances, the predicted technological performance exceeds this scale. 
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